Another Round of Repression in Iran

          While approaching the New Year and the presidential election that is set for June 8 of this month, the ruling hardliners have started a new wave of repression and eradication of independant political activists, thinkers, and those in favour of reform to expand their oppressive policies.

Within this period, dozens of nationalist-religious figures have been detained, accused of overthrowing the system and other charges alike.  Government agents have forced some of those arrested into concessions under brutal tortures.  In two separate cases, one on Monday 16 of April and the other on Sunday 22 of April, large number of students and the leader of the student movement, among them Heshmatollahe TABARZADI, the leader of Iranian People’s Democratic Front, were attacked by security agents and the Hizbollah vigilantes.  They were later taken to the regime’s unknown torture houses, after they were beaten and disrespected.  In the last month, the detainment of intellectuals has continued; for instance, a few days ago Hamid NAINI, the chief editor of the monthly Payam Emrooz « today’s message », and Mohammad SALAMATI, the Secretary-general of the Islamic Revolutionary Mojahedin and the chief editor of Asre Ma « Our Times » the official organ of the Party, were detained and later tried.  Also, the judiciary in another attempt tried 121 people among those who had been arrested in the incident involving the attack on the annual gathering of the students in the city of Khoram-Abad.  Those that were attacked were mostly students, and they were tried and convicted (to various imprisonment terms up to 5 years).

This incident happened while the inquiry council and the Parliament’s follow-up of the incident clearly indicated that those attacked the students were behind the unrest, and should be detained and tried.

It is obvious that the current suppressions were the continuation of the anti-reform campaign that had started after the defeat of the ruling camp in the parliamentary elections last year.  They were organized by the unjust hardliner dominated judiciary and the legal centres of power of the regime, but this new wave of supression was more obvious and presumably more legal in its execution, and more aimful in its context; furthermore, careful plans were drawn.  Because in this stage liberals, intellectuals, student activists, and active reformers in the outer circle of power, and also moderate reformists within the ruling camp were not and will not be protected.  This new stage of supression conveys several things: first, it is the sign of a sharp contrast between the general populace of Iran and the totality of the Islamic Republic; second, the growing power struggle between the two governing camps within the state.  These actions led even to further struggle and dispute between the two sides of the regime.  Third, it is also an indication of how important the next election is for both sides because of the particular interest of each side, and the overall interest and the future of the system.

If the second point has been the reason behind the disruption of relations between the two camps of power, it seems that in the perception of both, the interest and the future of the system is under threat.  This after all might finally lead to greater ties between the higher ranks of both sides.  As you observe, part of the regime’s ruling conservative camp has not been silent to the reformist within the system in the process of supression, in particular to the radical groups who have closer ties with the reformist outside the power structure.  The ruling conservative camp is attempting (along with showing an upper hand in terms of power and capability) to get into an arrangement with the reformists in power who between true reform and the interest of the system (meaning the interest of the ruling mafia) will choose the latter.  This is due to the understandings that on one hand, they do not have a base among the populace, and on the other, returning to the pre-76 period using harsh methods, which means further face-off with the general public, intensifying general public unrest, and speeding up the process of toppling the regime.  This is why they have attempted to stage a harsh attack on the most sensitive segment of the reformist movement outside the power struggle (nationalist-religious figures and groups), powerful student movement, and independant reformist publications, and they have exhausted all their power to prevent the reformation of the third segment outside the regime’s power structure.   At the same time, to threaten and dispense the radical reformists in power (part of the reformist deputies, number of notable state administrators) as it was mentioned before who have been supporting the radical reformist outside power.

The regime’s ruling camp wants to alienate part of the leading reformist movement from the power struggle, so if Khatami wants to candidate himself, he will be the one that on one hand looses the serious reformist support outside power, and on the other hand, it will be easier to contain him, particularly within the last 4 years as he has shown that he is fully ready to get along and negotiate with the ruling hardliners, because in these sensitive periods, he has been along the hardliners camp.  But the most primitive and backwarded groups of the regime’s ruling elite (Guardian Council, clerics such as Janati, Yazdi, Khaz-ali...and other suppressive organs and elites) not only are against any reformist movement either marginalized or sharing power, but also, in essence they are against the republican principle of the system, and are in favour of an Islamic state or a theocratic Islam.  This is why as they have proven, they are welcoming any use of force against the slightest criticism of «Velayat Motlageh Faqih» or absolute juriscouncil.

Khamanie as the leader of the power mafia is clearly backing the hardliners camp in the power struggle between the two sides, and at the same time, pretending to play the neutral and interconnecting role.

However, there is no doubt that the new wave of repression, eradication and struggle between the people and the ruling mafia that has been more intensive in the wake of the presidential elections will transform itself into a new phase by the end of the election.  Either the reformist within the regime and on top of them Khatami will still remain silent, and observe the eradication of faithful reformist inside and outside power that in this case the Iranian public will be further disappointed; they will eventually turn their back on the reformists, and they will make no distinction between them and the Islamic Republic.  Or at the end, reacting to such conditions, the reformists will take drastic approaches that are favoured by the public.  Only in this case, they can force the ruling camp to retreat and they can count on the public support for the dead-end they are face with currently.

Article translated from KURDISTAN, Organ of the Central Committee of PDKI